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In this paper I want to show the import and the centrality of Freedom as 
Creativity in the philosophy of Plotinus. I will only say a little about Freedom's cardinal 
role and centrality in his thought, as I defend that position at length in my forthcoming 
book on the topic (and on Enneads 6.8). Instead, I will show the link between Freedom 
and Creativity in Section 1, then speak of Creativity as a human good and ideal when 
understood in the Plotinian sense, touching also upon the light it sheds on general 
problem of philosophy (Section 2); and finally, of cosmic creativity and the parallels 
between Plotinus’ thought on the topic and some areas of the new physics (Section 3).
Plotinus speaks of Freedom primarily in Enneads 6.8. the treatise on Free Will of 
the One. According to the Plotinian Concordance, there are only another few passages, 
throughout the Enneads. where Plotinus discusses "freedom" directly. '  None of these 
other instances contradicts the main doctrine outlined in 6.8, and the latter is perfectly 
consistent with the rest of the Enneads as a whole. It is clear that I can only affirm 
this at this time, and not defend my contention as I have done elsewhere, with copious 
textual evidence. At any rate, the importance of this treatise (i.e. Enneads 6.8.) cannot 
be overemphasized. I have also learned a great deal about Plotinus’ thought in this 
regard from the late Fr. Vincenzo Cilento. particularly from some of the articles in the 
collected papers, titled Saaai su Plotino.^
Section 1 - Freedom and Contemplation as Creativity
Once again, I believe that the central notion of Plotinus’ philosophy is "freedom," 
understood in his own unique, multifaceted way. Cilento also believed this, and he 
discovered no less than ten separate though interconnected senses of "freedom" in the 
Enneads. -' It might be useful to state briefly what these are, so that "freedom as 
creativity" might be understood in context. They are, 1) Freedom as Contemplation, 
representing our upward path in its two converging aspects-the explanatory and the 
purifying power of freedom; these two paths will be present in 2) Freedom as Salvation, 
then as 3) Freedom: Genius, Ease of Life, or the essential component of man, perhaps 
this can be understood as "daimon"; 4) Freedom as explanatory principle (this time in a 
Universal sense), will lead to 5) Freedom as Conclusion/Culmination of the upward path. 
At that pinnacle, it is 6) Freedom as the Good, and 7) Freedom as the One’s Nature 
and 8) Freedom as Unity. It is also 9) Freedom as Root of Existence and, finally, 10) 
Freedom as Creation. Here we come full circle, for it is both the end and the starting 
point, the alpha and the omega of the Plotinian cycle. It is mainly with the latter sense 
that I will be concerned in this paper.
Freedom as Creation is the highest meaning of freedom in its identification with 
the One, as He engenders the Universe in all its complexity. From our standpoint 
instead, keeping in mind Plotinus’ advice, and the description of the highest goal of a 
human being, "alone to the Alone," Freedom as Absolute Solitude appears to be the 
most important aspect. The outcome of our journey of ascent is to proceed through 
virtue, to Oneness. Virtue, in turn, consists in progressively "freeing" oneself so that--at 
journey’s end--solitude and freedom coincide.
The truly creative power of soul and--in general--of the three Primary Hypostases, 
their "dynamis", is willed (Enn. 5.1.2 and 5.3.16.2-3). Cilento terms contemplation, at 
one point, as "spontaneous creation." We must bear in mind the unavoidable 
identification of freedom and the will, as outlined by Plotinus in 6.8 (as applied to both
ourselves and--in another way--to the One). We must also bear in mind the further link 
between the will and intelligence in which alone, rather than in action or circumstances, 
our freedom manifests itself, -then we shall see that the activity of freedom is 
"contemplative intelligence."
As in all other such cases, we need to understand "intelligence" in a different 
way when it refers to the One. In the case of His Contemplation, we can say that it is 
the source of the latter’s creative, tireless power: Cilento calls it "infaticabile potenza," 
Armstrong, "overwhelming p o w e r . )  It is also the source of intelligence at the level of 
Nous, and below it. Nous possesses all life and intelligence, virtue of its participation in 
the power of the One. In his discussion of intellect, Plotinus says, "...he is not satisfied 
with the contemplation of his father, but aspires to--we might say-the active power with 
which his grandfather establishes reality in being" (Enn. 5.5.3.23-25).
Thus "contemplation" which is free, that is, not according to form plan or design 
at the level of the One, encompasses creative, active power, manifesting the link with 
will/freedom, on one hand, and on the other hand, the "procession" metaphor of the 
King and the "lesser rulers going before it," which occurs in the chapter already cited 
(5.5.3.9-12). It is here that the connection between contemplation and freedom is to be 
found. At the apex of the Plotinian metaphysical universe, is the One, Absolute 
Freedom and Solitude, Will and effortless creativity: these are all simply ways of 
attempting to understand his total and unique oneness. Our journey of ascent and 
highest destiny, is that of progressive unification, yet all of the above concepts acquire 
different meanings when applied to us.
Our freedom is by no means absolute; it is the carefully cultivated and 
deliberately fought for understanding that for "us" (our upper soul), there is but "One" 
choice. Our solitude is won through the effort to learn to recognize the folly of easy 
involvement in our own fortunes, good or bad, or in those of anyone else: in this way, 
freedom and solitude grow apiece. They coincide as we free ourselves "from lure" 
(2.3.9.27); Cilento says, the soul becomes "libera dall’inganno." It is only at that stage 
that we can invoke the One, "not by words," but by leaning toward Him, "alone to the 
Alone" (5.1.6.11). Solitude, like freedom, has many faces: only in the One, are the two 
uniquely one. In Him, solitude implies no lack, it is only the manifestation of a 
multifaceted simplicity.
In us, the liberating journey of increased true self-awareness in regard to our 
Source gradually removes the hard shell of self-willing, isolating individuality. The 
paradox then is that a true understanding of "along to the Alone" discloses our intimate 
kinship with our world. Armstrong says: "...we may....begin to feel again the need for 
some sense of unity with our world and not be content to stand apart from it, isolated 
and superior thinking beings over against a mass of brute matter in which there is no 
living thought..."0) Our understanding then, does not lead to what would amount to 
human arrogance in a self-conscious stance of inappropriate self-sufficiency, but rather a 
true grasp of cosmic holiness and wholeness, the precursor to the kind of participation 
in Being that will allow Aquinas to posit an intimate link between human nature and the 
"actus purus." Therefore, although freedom as the One is not the same thing as 
freedom, progressively actualized in the self, we can still say that freedom as unity 
indicates the oneness we always possessed, but only understood as we became truly 
free. Freedom is thus the beginning and the end. It is what the One is, and therefore
4it is the root of existence as well as the culmination of our re-ascent. Every paradoxical 
aspect of the thinking of Plotinus is essentially clarified and incorporated in yet another 
metaphysical cornerstone of the philosophical edifice he has erected.
Freedom has now been viewed essentially as culmination, final goal, good and 
unity. Yet is would be a mistake to regard it as final in the sense of static. Perhaps 
the most important aspect of freedom becomes manifest when we reach its utmost limit, 
namely that the "limit" imposes no limitation on something that is essentially outflowing: 
"No more than in the circle are the lines or circumference to be identified with that 
centre which is the source of both: radii and circle are images given forth by indwelling 
power and as products of a certain vigour, not cut off from it" (6.8.18). Freedom is the 
source and the power: "...it generates Intellectual Principle by its sheer wealth" (6.8.18).
It is the cause of the cause and the "root of existence." In yet another paradox, the 
One is the ultimate in development, even though its power reveals "the development of 
the undeveloped" (6.8.18). As a "self-presence, issuing from Himself," the One is in a 
sense, its own first creation: it is "self-springing" (6.8.15). Plotinus explains: "...it is like 
the principle and ground of some vast tree of rational life" (6.8.15).
We need to regard freedom as the One, as a continuously eternally springing 
source. The outer limit of being is not nothing: there is no end, no final point. What 
we see in Plotinus is an eternally flowing circle. The last and first meaning of freedom, 
then, is "creative power," both the root and the final aim of existence. The One’s 
"deliberation (boulesis) is his ousia. McKenna translates: "...God and will were 
primarily identical" (6.8.21). And, as the highest activity is not practical, for Plotinus, but 
contemplative, not chance, but the One’s creative contemplation constitute the Source.
Section Two - Freedom as Creativity: a Human Ideal
It is not difficult to appeal to any number of sources and argue for freedom’s role 
as divine (in a non-metaphorical, literal sense). This is the way Plotinus is read by a 
number of commentators, who view him as a precursor of Christianity, and value him 
accordingly. But if we understand freedom as creativity in a Christian sense, we need 
to position at least a partial identification of the One with God of the great monotheistic 
religions.
In a recent paper read at a symposium on Creativity, William Desmond terms 
this reading of creativity the "monarchical view," which he ascribes primarily to Aquinas. 
This view entails "creation ex nihilo": "...creativity names an unconditional origination, 
the real origination of the essentially other or new; to God alone belongs this radical 
a c t .^  He contrasts this view with the "aristocratic view of creativity" proposed by 
Nietzche, engendered by his hatred of the "flattening effect of modern democracy." Yet- 
-he adds-his emphasis has been taken up, not by the few, but by the many." If the 
"creator was to be, not mean," if creativity as an ideal implies that everyone has to be 
"creative, absolutely original, unique," then everyone is "absolutely the same." Trivial 
forms of so-called creativity reign ("creative life-styles," "creative budgeting"^nd the like), 
but genuine creativity vanishes precisely in this common, relentless pursuit.''
In the next section, we will see that for Plotinus creativity could be said to exist 
throughout the universe, in various degrees, and that this accords with recent 
discoveries in both physics and biology. For now, I would like to consider two
5questions. First, whether creativity can be understood in a non-religious sense, and still 
retain his primacy as an ideal in a human sense, while fitting to some extent within 
Plotinus’ own views. Second, I will argue that human creativity shows the key to 
solving the conflict between viewing only certain aspects of human knowledge as real 
and respectable (those connected with the sciences), and others as "soft," not quite 
knowledge in its proper sense (e.g. philosophy, religion, the arts).
On the first point, it seems clear that while Free Creativity might conceivably 
define the divine, it can also characterize the highest capacity we find in a human 
being, and it is one of the very few human activities that is universally admired and 
approved of. Here I am not expressing a value judgment which is solely tied to an 
Aristotelian understanding of contemplation, or rather, of contemplative reason in human 
beings. Nor am I only referring to the popular admiration for the "new" which is often 
inappropriate, as Desmond suggest, but also to the fact that in art, music, literature, 
indeed, in all fields of cultural endeavour, along with the orginality requirement applied 
to doctoral dissertations and scholarly publications, the admiration and prizes showered 
upon new discoveries--all of this seems to indicate that free creativity is indeed taken to 
be a great value.
At this point I pause to raise the question how freedom and creativity can be 
joined. Hausman, for instance, speaks of "spontaneity" rather than "freedom." There 
are good reasons for regarding the two as closely related. Hausman’s procedure is to 
examine instances of "radical novelty" in order to discover their nature. Among the 
characteristics of such novelty is a lack of conscious direction on the part of the would- 
be creator. The creative act is usually preceeded by a long period x)f preparation; then 
the task at hand is forgotten; finally there is a "sudden illumination. ' Hausman 
appeals to Darwin and suggest that "creative achievement" entails "Novelty Proper," 
although he also throws in "value" as a requirement: "In short, Novelty Proper implies 
spontaneity and, if value is present, creativity. '
In art, literature and the sciences, the combination of Novelty Proper with 
spontaneity (I would prefer to call it freedom) may manifest a leap ahead of the tradition 
or may even "initiate" a new tradition that is discontinuous with the time, place and 
background from which the novelty has arisen. "Creativity includes an element of 
discovery and an element of control. Thus it is neither the^production of what was 
familiar, nor simply the discovery of what was unfamiliar."10' Does the "control" aspect 
eliminate the possibility of equating spontaneity with freedom? I think this not the case. 
The creative struggle is not limited to any specifics to which it must conform: "...an 
artist struggles to effect something the exact character of which he does not envisage." 
Yet he does know when he has reached his goal -- or some satisfactory approximation 
of it. Hence the only criterion which might exert "control" over both creative process 
and the final.created effect would appear to be the value that is sought, achieved and 
recognized.11' Hausman adds that many of the difficult questions that arise in this 
context "can only be answered in the context of a comprehensive theory, an ontology 
and a value theory that does justice to radical creativity."1 It seems to me that 
Plotinus’ doctrine even with its total lack of concern for human creativity (at least in its 
artistic and scientific aspects) is just such a "comprehensive theory."
6If it is granted that creativity is indeed a great, or even the greatest human 
value, especially if it is understood, as Plotinus would, as essentially "good," we can 
view it as separate from the religious understanding of the concept, without thereby 
seeing a conflict between the two. Further, turning now to the second point intended to 
explore, the notion of creativity so understood, helps reconcile the alleged difference 
between the so-called "soft" disciplines, such as philosophy and religious thought, and 
the "hard" disciplines, such as the sciences. It is undeniable that the current cultural 
and social climate showers scientific work and research with an unprecedented awe and 
respect. Such attitudes no doubt originated in a healthy respect for the dignity of 
unaided human reason and a recognition for the value of objectivity and 
experimentation. But it has since "progressed" to the point where Objectivity and 
Experimentation have replaced the unquestionable and unquestioned idols they were 
originally intended to refute.
This prevailing "scientific model" or measure of all things, in fact tries to reduce 
philosophy to what is logically or empirically provable: but this criterion or standard of 
philosophical legitimacy is not internally required. Instead, we should note that not all 
sciences are alike in method, procedures and aims. Neither is there anything 
intrinsically better or superior about any specific "hard science," e.g. physics, according 
to some. As we shall see in the next section, even this claim is now severely disputed 
by many, as indeterminacy and unpredictability are present in quantum physics, for 
instance. The most serious question raised in connection with philosophical 
argumentation (and with religious one as well) is that of verifiability. All philosophical 
argumentation proceeds according to logic, but both principles and conclusions 
sometimes turn out to be unverifiable in the ordinary sense of the term, and also 
unverifiable within the limits proposed by other sciences. And while sciences recognize 
that logical principles cannot be verified by experiment or observation, the same license 
is not extended to either conclusions or first principles, for the status claimed for them 
is more than merely logical.
It is my contention that creative liberty in its human instantiations-as it manifests 
itself through totally original scientific discoveries or through artistic, literary, musical, or 
philosophical work that deserve to be call great-bridges the perceived gulf between:
(a) scientifically verifiable conclusions, and (b) conclusions that are not scientifically 
verifiable, together with the principles by which they unfold or come to be. Those who 
regard the notion of creative freedom as interchangeable with that of divine existence 
posit it as signifying absolute power and goodness-something ultimately ineffable and 
beyond human comprehension. No one regards human creativity as either omnipotent 
or totally good. (Later I will return to the question of creativity in relation to this issue.) 
The intractability of the concept (and fact) of human free, creative originality applies to 
work in all the sciences, arts and disciplines, as does the fact that each occurence of 
creativity gives rise to wonder and awe within us. The marvelous achievements of a 
Mozart, a Leonardo, an Einstein, or a Plato are all equally incomprehensible to us, 
since they are different in kind from even the most praiseworthy activity of people who 
are limited to understanding, following and perhaps duplicating some or all of the steps 
involved in these exceptional achievements.
What should give rise to even greater amazement, perhaps, is the fact that even 
the thinkers and artists themselves are baffled by the gratuitous final act of intuition or 
imagination that guarantees them a place apart from the general run of humanity. In a
7letter, Mozart tells us how ideas for his musical compositions came to him: "...waking 
after a good meal, or during the night when I cannot sleep, it is on such occasions that 
my ideas flow best and most abundantly. Whence and how they come, I know not, nor 
can I force them." Mozart also writes: "...provided I am not disturbed, my subject 
enlarges itself, becomes methodized and defined, and the whole, though j tb e  long, 
stands almost complete in my mind so that I can survey it...at a glance."1 ö'
The conditions that procede a discovery or a freely creative act include 
knowledge or preparation that does not differ from the sort of preparation we all 
undergo in order to master a subject. But from that point on, the creative individual is 
no longer bound to previously mastered specifics or to any methodology whatever. The 
description of free creation we find in Mozart’s letter does not really differ from a similar 
occasion described by Poincare, who tells us how he arrived at final, original 
mathematical insights. After working for a long time to reach a conclusion about a 
specific mathematical question, an idea came to him under unexpected circumstances.
At the time he was taking a trip connected with a geological expedition: "The changes 
of travel made me forget my mathematical work. Having reached Coutances, we 
entered an omnibus to go someplace or other. At the moment when I put my foot on 
the step the idea came to me, without having anything in my former thoughts seeming 
to have paved the way for it, that the transformations I had used to define the Fuchsian 
function were identical with those of non-Euclidian geometry."14' Poincare could not 
explain how this insight came to him, but what is clear is that mathematical creative 
insight "does not consist in making new combinations with mathematical entities already 
known," for if this were the case, almost anyone willing to devote enough time to the 
enterprise would be capable of achieving such creative heights--and this is just not so. 
Furthemore, Poincare adds that it is not entirely true that "to invent is to choose." 
Invention is not choice among an infinite number of "sample" answers. Wheruthe idea 
comes, it is characterized by "brevity, suddenness, and immediate certainty."10' 
Appealing to a choice made from among many possibilities does not, then, even being 
to answer the principal question, namely, why this particular choice, and how does one 
arrive at it? The answer, not surprisingly, is that no one knows--not even those who 
actually have the experience.
The significant point as far as the act of creative freedom is concerned, then, is 
that it is always awesome, marvelous, ineffable, and impossible to predict, explain or 
analyze. It makes no difference whether the "experience" concerns philosophical 
conclusions, religious or even mystical experiences and intuitions, scientific discoveries, 
or artistic insight. The leading figures in the sciences, arts and humanities undergo 
basically the same experience, and neither the artist nor the mathematician can explain 
it. The fact that a given discipline is more exact does not mean that it has more exact 
answers to this question.
On the other hand, whereas the scientist and the mathematician can verify their 
sudden, creative intuition through experiment, neither the philosopher nor the artist can 
do so. (Yet we might say that the genius of figures like Plato and Mozart is eventually 
"verified" in some sense, via the judgments made by many people over a long period of 
time.) In this sense, creative freedom can be regarded as giving rise to what is highest 
in human achievement, to the best that beings can do in almost any field. The 
experience is also of such a nature that it reunites different disciplines-at least through 
the highest experiences of those who excel.
8At this point someone might object that since the experience is indefinable, there 
is no solid ground for such a claim. If something cannot be exhaustively defined, it is 
hard to decide with any certainty what it is really like. And then it will be equally hard 
to affirm that two such indefinable experiences are like one another. For example, the 
claims made by the mystic are almost ¡definable if we require a public demonstration of 
their actuality. And if this is so, it will be difficult to defend the claim that all mystical 
experiences are not the same, that they do not reflect "an underlying similarity which 
transcends cultural and religious diversity," in the sense that even if the various 
descriptions of the mystics are culturally bound, "their experience is not."lb ‘ Katz 
discusses this problem in detail and gives many examples. He concludes that "there 
are no pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences." Thus, even if we could be sure that all 
mystical experiences are experiences of the same X, Katz argues, they are always 
necessarily mediated through the beliefs, preparation, goals and background of Mystic A 
or Mystic B.
Even if we agree with this assessment, what remains constant is the existence of 
certain preparations, conditions and expressions of mystical experience. These 
experiences are like acts of free creative intuition in that they are intrinsically indefinable 
and ineffable. I believe we could draw a parallel here and say that all acts of free, 
creative intuition are mediated through the individual preparation and also the 
methodologies required by the specific sciences and arts practiced by these exceptional 
individuals. In other words, just as a Hindu or a Sufi mystic will have only Hindu or 
Sufi mystical experiences, so an artist is not likely to reach a freely creative conclusion 
in mathematics, any more than a scientist is apt to discover the ultimate symphony or 
sonata.
To sum up, my claim is that individuals who are so far "above" or different from 
others with the same calling that they can reach a moment of free creativity of the sort 
I have sketched, will indeed have different experiences, but they will all be alike in that 
they can accomplish the feat of going beyond discursive, argumentative reason. They 
do so through a sudden, freely creative act which, while different in each and every one 
of them, still serves to distinguish their achievement from what the rest of us are able 
to attain. There is a certain amount of commonness in the form and the conditions of 
the creative act itself, and also in terms of the formal, laborious preparations that are 
required in all cases; in virtue of this commonness, we can describe the freely creative 
act as basically alike in all cases.
If this claim can be accepted, the free act of creativity bridges the gap between 
different methodologies that are appropriate to the different disciplines. This would then 
indicate, first, that the alleged difference between philosphical and religous thought do 
not extend to the highest instances of each, and second, that even the alleged 
differences between "softer" and "hard" disciplines falls away at this level.
A further point needs examination. I have repeatedly characterized Creative 
Freedom not just as a possible first principle (or even a religous first principle) but also 
as the highest value in purely human terms. Even if it should be granted that all the 
different methodologies and preparations (whether in the sciences or the humanities) 
represent necessary conditions for the freely creative act, they are not sufficient by 
themselves to achieve it. The final act is so rare and wonder-full that we view it as the 
ultimate in human achievement. Yet this view is open to a serious objection.
9If we define the ultimate in human freedom as the freely creative act, with its 
components of originality, highest quality of content within the specific discipline, and 
sudden intuitive discovery, are we not viewing it purely formal terms? What we have in 
mind, presumably, are examples like great works of art or the achievements of Nobel 
Prize winners, but is there anything in our account that would require that the 
achievement be something good? Could we not, in principle, declare that an especially 
original mass murderer or exterminator also transcends general human abilities? Is it 
possible that Eichmann’s grandiose ideas for oenocide came to him in a way similar to 
the way intuitions struck Mozart or Einstein?1
What I am suggesting at this point is not only that a marvelous human invention 
or discovery can be used afterwards for nefarious purposes by either its originator or 
other people who have access to it (this is an obvious truism), but also that it might be 
possible to reach the highest pinnacle of creativity when spurred by an absolute evil 
goal or an evil of the greatest magnitude. If we look at the description of the creative 
act and of the experiences leading up to it, we see that they lend themselves equally 
well-in principle—to evil free creation. (We should not be misled by the fact that the 
examples are always chosen from people who made highly positive contributions to the 
welfare of mankind.)
It is at this point that the Plotinian understanding of Freedom as the Good can 
be reintroduced in order to formulate an answer to this difficulty: it is only when we use 
Freedom (the Good) as Creativity that we can escape a specific or generally religious 
understanding of creativity—if that is indeed our desire-while retaining goodness as a 
necessary component. As I have shown, "evil freedom" is a contradiction in terms for 
Plotinus: if an act is evil, it cannot be free, and vice versa. There is nothing marvelous 
or wonderful about Eichmann’s achievements when they are viewed from this 
perspective. For Plotinus such "achievements" would instead represent a manifestation 
of utter un-freedom and a lack of reason; they would signal a complete 
misunderstanding of the world as a whole, and also of our place and function within it.
Therefore, although the notion of value is implicit in our judgments of freely 
creative orginality (regardless of whether they pertain to scientists, artists or 
philosophers), there appears to be nothing intrinsically good about a creative act as 
such-unless, of course, we understand creativity in the Plotinian sense, a sense that 
explicitly includes value as ultimate and as part of a cohesive worldview. And so, even 
if we should reach the conclusion that the concept of a freely creative act is a morally 
neutral notion (unless we qualify it in terms of some value we import in order to be able 
to regard it as the highest human achievement), we no longer have to add any 
qualification after we have understood it in Plotinian terms.
Creative freedom can therefore be regarded as bridging the alleged gap between 
the "hard" sciences and the humanities. This it does through a shared, ultimate 
experience underlying creativity in these two domains. It can also help overcome the 
perceived conflict between religion and philosophy, which is an instance of the same 
species of difficulty as the one between the sciences and the humanities. Creative 
freedom gives rise to a freely creative intuition, an act that is vastly different from the 
intuitive capacity we employ and manifest in general in our life and which shares with 
that act its characteristic nature as non-discursive, non-procedural and indefinable.
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Bambrough, for instance, analyzes tha procedure we use to follow a step-by-step 
demonstration and shows that the demonstrative validity of each step along the way is 
grasped in an essentially intuitive manner: "it is not by any procedure that we know 
each step is sound."18' Bambrough acknowledges that "philosophers become 
quarrelsome when some in their number suggest that in morals and criticism, as well as 
in mathematics and logic, there are some things ihat can be known without proof and 
can serve as the basis of proof and argument. His main claim is that the limitations 
present in words and expression, which are attested to by those who deal primarily in 
words, such as poets (he cites T. S. Eliot as an example), do not point to a 
corresponding non-existence of the entities which the words strive--more or less 
successfully-to refer to. In some cases, the fact that a precise definition is not 
available does not indicate that we are confronted with a non-entity. In a similar vein, 
Hausman, whe discussing creativity and the "fundamental paradox" and intelligibility, 
cites the example of a piece of music. Even if the music is understood via the musical 
pattern it manifests and is analyzed in terms of "repeated melodies, harmonic support... 
[and] qualities correlated with emotions and extra-musiçaLideas," the piece we listen to 
ultimately "is not exhausted by this kind of in te llig ib ility .' Likewise, the absence of a 
rational explanation or definition for a general principle does not indicate lack on our 
part-and thereby also a false belief. The mystery of the holy sometimes best 
expressed by silence, and so Bambrough observes: "There is indefinitely wide scope, 
and not only in philosophy, for the inarticulate understanding that the philosopher denies 
or demeans. And not only the philosophers. 1 ' He concludes that non-procedural 
intuition includes those things that deserve to be called the foundations or ultimate 
grounds of the rest of our knowledge.
My claim is that while Bambrough is correct in arguing for "intuition" as the 
common denominator in all life experience and knowledge, Plotinus’ notion of Freedom 
as Creative V a lu e d  unites the highest supernoetic experience (an experience that is 
beyond discursive rationality) attainable by human beings, even if they attain it only 
rarely. The fact that it is indescribable and ineffable and remains stubbornly opaque to 
any human effort to grasp its essential nature should not count against either its 
existence or its value. It should, hoewever, spur further interest,--and also promote 
research into this question that has puzzled, awed and intrigued human beings for 
centuries.
Section Three - Cosmic Creativity in Plotinus and Some New Scientific Discoveries.
We have now arrived at the last, but perhaps primary aspect of creativity: its 
cosmic aspect in Plotinus, viewed against the background of today’s science, particularly 
the new physics. All creativity in Plotinus is centered in the One: He is the Source 
from which Nous comes, the Soul, followed by Souls, and the rest of the universe. It is 
Absolute Simplicity, engendering effortlessly the greatest multiplicity; yet the stamp of 
Nous-so to speak--the forming of Intelligence cannot be denied to the whole Universe 
and everything within it. Plotinus says, "...but now let us talk about the earth itself, and 
trees, and plants in general, and ask what their contemplation is, and how we can 
relate what the earth makes and produces to its activity of contemplation..." (Enn. 3.8.2. 
18-23). This, in some sense, underlies Plotinus’ argument against the Gnostics (2.9), in 
fact, Plotinus’ battle against what Cilento terms the "two adversaries, the old and the 
new," referring not only to the Gnostics’ "chance" but also to Aristotle’s "Thought 
thinking Itself," neither which Plotinus accepts. ' In regard to the One, the argument
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is simple: what majesty could one possibly ascribe to an entity engendered by chance? 
A thing of chance excludes reasons and reason itself from its existence. Plotinus says, 
"Such a statement is untrue to its subject, and introduces much difficulty." (Enn. 6.8.7). 
Moreover, if we cannot locate the principle of free will in the First, in what sense could 
it possibly be applied to us? Since the One is the Source of whatever we have and 
are, we cannot ascribe freewill to ourselves, while denying it to Him. Nor can we say 
that the One "acts in accordance with its being" (6.8.7), for that would make His nature 
a prior, thus a superior entity. The One would then no longer be the First, but would 
simply follow upon it, which would be a contradiction in terms. Moreover, this would 
also introduce an inappropriate duality between the One and His Being.
The second "adversary" is denied by Plotinus through his denial of knowledge to 
the One. The One requires neither will nor knowledge (as we, for instance, do), since 
neither multiplicity nor choices exist at that level. There is nothing for Him to transcend, 
to will Himself away from, to choose: as Aristotle said, long before Plotinus, nature 
makes nothing in vain, thus for the One to possess our sort of will and knowledge 
would be pointless, even if it were possible. Plotinus maintains: "Conscious awareness, 
in fact is likely to enfeeble the very activities of which there is consciousness...only 
when they are alone are they pure and more genuinely active and living" (1.4.10.30-34). 
Therefore, something that is Pure Act and Pure Vituality cannot be dimmed by such 
obfuscation. Yet he is--in some sense-awake to Himself, since there is nothing else for 
Him to be awake to, and eternally so: "a wakening without an awakener, and eternal 
awakening and a supra-Intel lection" (6.8.16; McKenna).
Therefore Freedom and Will are not only present in, but identical with, the One, 
although neither planning nor design are to be found in Him. He creates not as He is, 
but simply as "generating power" (to en dunamis panton): "life and thought and all 
things come from the One, because that Good is not one of all things, for this is how 
all things come from Him, because he is not confined to any shape. That One is 
alone: if He was all things, he, would be numbered among beings. For this reason that 
One is none of things in Intellect, but all things come from Him" (5.1.5.18-23; 
Armstrong).
We cannot expect to understand either clearly or a lot of a First Principle, or 
even to raise too many questions: negative predication is best, though unclear, and 
whenever we choose to use concepts positively, they must be prefaced-at least in our 
mind--by "as if." In chapter 15 of Enneads 6.8, as we saw earlier, Plotinus compares 
the One to the roots of an immense tree, the very source of all reason and beauty. In 
chapter 16, the picture becomes progressively clearer. His is not "everywhere"; the 
"everywhere" is in Him-in fact, it is Him. All things surround Him and crown Him (Enn. 
6.8.16.10-12). What remains positive, is that chance is not and cannot be what brings 
about the universe, and neither in intellection, at least not as far as the Primary Source 
is concerned. Trouillard explains that the One simply confers the power to generate 
intelligence on the second Hypostasis: both Being and Nous are "first-born" (5.2.1.7), 
but somehow the a-noetic One can confer noetic properties. Nous, however, sees 
"without thought" (6.7.16.14). Its thought, which originates from the Source, is "non­
thought, richer than though itself" (6.7.35.3φ.. This is a "contect" understanding of Nous 
not unlike the one suggested by Von Fritz. ' Yet the paradox of infusing intelligence 
without possessing it is not the only one found in the One. As mentioned, He also 
represents "radical freedom" and "structure," with the latter understood as freely chosen
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and setf.-originating. Trouillard suggests that he exercises the former by imposing the 
latter. '
The order His creation manifests is caused by His design and His providence.
In chapter 17 Plotinus argues that He willed and planned the order that testifies to us of 
providence in the universe. Thus he reaffirms that it is not by chance that the First 
Principle is and acts. Yet we still face the perplexity of how the One can confer 
properties He does not Himslef possess. Only Beauty, Goodness and Freedom-albeit 
understood in a different sense when applied to the One-seem to escape when we 
consider this dilemma, for they can be found in the universe even though they exist 
primarily in the One. As we saw, Being, Intellection, self-mastery (properly speaking), 
and simple freedom of choice are not in the One. Providentially designed order 
appears to belong to the second group (i.e. qualities that are not in the One), while 
Providence appears to be There, but only as a source of its actual application.
Once again Plotinus’ main interest appears to be in refuting any possibility of 
"chance happening" being predicated of the One, which was also what he argued 
against in his treatise opposing the Gnostics (Enn. 2.9). It is not completely clear why 
certain properties or characteristics can be in the One, whereas others are presented as 
though their existence in the world rules out their presence in the One. The only 
plausible explanation that occurs to me is that Freedom, Beauty and Good may be 
understood in a way that does not import duality into the One, whereas the others 
cannot. At least we have seen Plotinus arguing against the introduction of duality for 
every single concept he admits into the One.
Perhaps we are falling into the trap of requiring and seeking too much 
clarification. We need to remember the warning Plotinus has sounded: leave Him in His 
infinite depth. That which follows upon Him is enough to embrace the totality of what 
He is, and enough for us to try and comprehend. A circumference draws its properties 
from its center: in this sense He "embraces and measures all things" (6.8.18.4-5). But 
in another sense, all things exhibit only "traces" of His quiet power (6.8.18.16-18).
In the final analysis we must admit that words fail us. We need to "see" Him 
(6.8.19.3-5) and abandon language with its failures and imprécisions. We understand, 
and we recognize His power, a power that does not even create according to an 
essence: it is "operating power." The only thing we can surely attest to is pure 
freedom, which is indeed the "essence" according to which He freely creates Himself 
and everything that is. At the supreme pinnacle He is totally free and alone and is the 
only example of "being freely oneself" that we can be aware of. Every other entity in 
the world is both itself and other simultaneously (6.8.21.30-33).
In the One, the Greek notion of individuality and self-determination, with all its 
nuances and interconnected meanings is stretched to its utmost limit for the first time. 
The result is the concept of absolute, infinite Freedom.
When we leave the ambit of Greek, Hellenistic or even-in general-of the history 
of philosophy, it is not easy to speak seriously of "creativity" or "creation" in a non­
human sense, outside a strictly religious context. Poltinus’ own view of creation of the 
universe, both of the way it came to be and the way it functions, has no claim to 
scientific verifiability and no interest in that aspect of the question at all. Now we have
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seen to what extennt the human meaning of "free creativity" fits within the Plotinian 
scenario and in turn helps to illuminate some other philosophical problems, the cosmic 
aspect of the same question should be looked at from the same, non-historical context.
Two dangers threaten such an enterprise; first, that of using Plotinian terms 
equivocally, that is, in a sense which goes beyond the specific, technical meaning they 
acquire within his thought. Second, that of reading Plotinus back illegitimately and 
anachronistically in some modern theory. Perhaps the two problems are really one and 
the same. At any rate, I will simply show how some of the new insights in physics and 
biology re-echo some of the metaphysical principles and concepts in Plotinus.
The first point worth noting is that in our effort to understand the coming to be of 
the universe, it is necessary to learn once again to look at it as purposeful and holistic 
(in an almost Aristotelian sense), rather than viewing it in a reductionist, mechanistic 
way. There has been an undeniable conflict originating in early Greek thought, but 
persisting to this date, between mechanistic reductionism and a purposeful view of the 
universe. It is the latter that tends to accord with what science learns today. The 
"reductionism" approach, the old so-called "scientific method," is no longer deemed to 
be absolutely valid:
Just as there are idealized simple systems (e.g. 
elementary particles) to use as building blocks in the 
reductionist approach so one must also search for 
idealized complex or irregular systems to use in the 
holistic approach...It is, in short, nothing less than 
a brand new start in the description of n a t u r e . '
Indeed in this way, it is not only Aristotle who is rivindicated, but also Plotinus, 
through that cosmic kinship that Armstrong, for instance, discovers in his work.
Because the soul for Plotinus, is not exclusively or even primarily human, Armstrong 
can affirm that "we havepa.single apprehension or awareness of divinity: self and 
cosmos, taken t o g e t h e r . '  He also writes that, although "the One or the Good 
correspond to what most of us....mean by God," we need neither religious orthodoxy nor 
mystical rapture to understand most of what Plotinus says. And-because Plotinus 
understands how central this insight is for life on earth-jie will want to move toward 
"closing the gap between man and non-human nature. ö' Here, of course, as he goes 
beyond Aristotle, Plotinus’ own intention is not to defend or uphold nature as such, but 
rather to uphold the One and, at the same time, whatever issues from that Source.
According to Plotinus, as we saw, in nature everything contemplates: intelligence, 
soul are not only signs of human dignity. Both are indeed present in different degrees 
in the different entities "receiving" them. But matter is not "brute" or soulless, some 
level or degree of form or intellection permeates all that is. A strange metaphysical 
motion? Perhaps. But some scientists view the ultimate origin of the universe as 
something which lies "on the boimdary of science," while others "would say it is beyond 
the scope of science altogether."20' Among the former are not only scientists, but 
philosophers.
Belgian Nobel prize-winner Ilya Prigogine says, "Our universe has a pluralistic, 
complex character. Structures may disappear, but also they may appear"; Evan Jantsch
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"expounds the view that nature has a sort of free will and is thereby capable of 
generating novelty."30' In simple terms, the difference lies between the view of a 
universe created once and for all, unfolding mechanistically according to strict, 
unbending laws, and the possibility that there might be alternative developments, "free 
choices" of sorts, that natural things might take. Paul Davies speaks of "matter with a 
will of its own": there is in nature a progressive drive from the simplicity of primordial 
gasses’ "soup" at the dawn of creation, towards increasing complexity: recent 
discoveries attest to the fact that simple l^ws and "simple procedures can be the source 
of almost limitless variety and complexity."31'
There are therefore indications of the existence of a "cosmic blueprint" or a sort 
of "global plan"3^' in both physical and chemical phenomena. Yet when matter moves 
from a state of equilibrium (or a "stable state") and faces two "alternative pathways of 
evoluation," "no prediction can be made about what ’branch’ will be chosen."33' Thus, 
in the indeterminacy and unpredictability inherent, for instance, to quantum physics, 
there is the clear possibility of an unpredictable event: matter exhitivs freedom of 
choice, therefore it exhibits also some inttlligence. Davies cites Prigogine on this point:
Prigogine calls this phenomenon order through
fluctuations, and proposes that it is a fundamental
organizing principle in nature: It seems that
environmental fluctuations can both affect bifurcation
and--more spectacularly-generate new non-equilibrium .
transitions not predicted by the phenomenological laws of evolution.34'
Plotinus could not anticipate Prigogine, nor am I suggesting that Prigogine drew his own 
insights from Plotinus. In the latter, it is the existence of form, intelligible and the 
product of Intelligence (Nous), that suggest to him the nature/contemplation passages of 
3.8. But whether he was interested in the physical consequences or implications of his 
metaphysical views or not, there might be a great deal of verfiable truth in his views 
after all.
Further, the creative progression from simplicity to multiplicity (or complexity) and 
the existence of intellection in the world outside human beings, are not the only "new 
discoveries" that suggest a renewed consideration of Plotinus’ doctrines. For instance, 
for him beauty and intellection go hand in hand: there is beauty in regular universal 
laws as well as truly moral action. But although we find the background to this doctrine 
in Plato, Plotinus forges ahead on a different path, as he claims that it is not correct to 
identify Beauty with Symmetry. His reason is that Beauty transcends Intelligence, as 
Nous is no longer the ultimate. But what Symmetry can there be in Absolute Simplicity 
and Unity?
Thus Plotinus is faced with the choice between either affirming there is no 
Beauty in the One (as there is no symmetry of parts possible there), or to abandon the 
Platonic connection between symmetry and beauty. Now symmetry entails not only 
parts to be arranged in a certain manner, thus multiplicity, but also the existence of 
certain pre-ordained, necessary laws, if we look for it in a universal, physical, natural 
context. For Plotinus, beauty and intelligence both permeate in various ways the whole 
universe: Beauty is one of the very few concepts (with that of Freedom and the Good)
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which are the One and are imparted to the rest of creation through Nous. Are there 
any recent scientific discoveries which re-echo some aspect of these doctrines? Davies, 
for instance, says:
Historians will distinguish three levels of enquiry in 
the study of matter. The first is Newtonian mechanics- 
-the triumph of necessity. The second is equilibrium 
thermodynamics--the triumph of chance. Now there is a 
third level, emerging from the study of far-from- 
equilibrium systems.
It is my belief that it is in this "third level" that we find the most interesting and 
philosophically deep aspects of science, and that many of these are strangely close to 
some ancient metaphysical insights. It is at this "third level", for instance, that we can 
raise the question of a "will" for matter, discussed above. It is also here that we find 
with Prigogine, "many physical, chemical and biochemical dissipative processes which 
display self-organization.
Under this heading also fit some amazing chemical processes, one of which, the 
so-called "chemical clock", manifests a chemical mixture deliberately forced away from 
equilibrium (or a steady state), which:
...suddenly starts to turn blue throughout. This lasts 
for a minute or two. Then it turns red, then blue, 
then red, and so on, pulsating with perfect 
regularity. ' '
"Prigogine refers to this remarkable rhythmic behavior as a ’chemical clock’", adds 
Davies. The ultimate reason for this strange phenomenon is "autocatalysis", whereby a 
"certain chemical reaction is accelerated. What this does, is to introduce "non-linearity" 
into the system, and thus produce a form of ’symmetry-breaking’". ' Therefore, 
necessity and symmetry are not matter’s unavoidable companions, the manifestation 
oflawlike regularity.
According to such discoveries, we might say, in Plotinian terms, that through 
"freedom" and a component of intellectual formation, all of nature is both law-like and 
formed, and, on occasion beautiful though a-symmetric, and somewhat creative in its 
processes. As the "chemical clock" example indicates, the original condition might well 
be "symmetric under time translations (it looks the same from one moment to the next), 
but this symmetry is spontaneously broken by oscillations. y' One is even reminded of 
Plotinus’ treatment of Providence, in Enneads 2.3(1) and 2.3(2). He dutifully reports 
Stoic arguments, but the centrality of. freedom in his doctrines does not permit the 
simple repetition of their doctrines.40' In essence, according to him, a human being is 
essentially free because of his upper soul, or true self that always remains There, 
undescended, with and like the One. Therefore, while matter is indeed under the away 
of neccessary laws, what is immaterial instead, is not in the same categoiy and needs 
not submit, (whether willingly or unwillingly) to unswerving rationality. Rationality, in fact, 
is below the highest goal in Plotinus: we must go beyond it, to be like the One, as 
much as possible, and that transcends even Nous. One might even speculate whether 
even Plotinus’ acceptance of this limited aspect of "necessity" from the Stoics, might 
need re-thinking.
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After ali, if a¡| nature contemplates, perhaps all of it, as ensouled and informed in 
some measure or other, possesses at least rudimentary freedom and consciousness.
As an additional "bonus" of sorts, this appears to be in line with verifiable recent 
discoveries and their astonishing implication. All comes from the Source for Plotinus 
and thus not only manifests traces of Nous’ intellective and forming activity, but also of 
the Freedom, Beauty and Goodness, which are the One. This position further cements 
the cosmic kinship Plotinus defends and supports the respect due all that is, in direct 
conflict with Gnostic teaching (2.9).
Conclusion
I have started by arguing for the identification of Freedom and Creativity in the 
One of Plotinus, before taking the notion of Creativity in its full Plotinian sense, and 
applying it to human endeavour, in order to establish its importance and value to human 
beings. If this value is accepted, then Plotinus may be interpreted as having a 
coherent metaphysics, even leaving aside a possible religious understanding of his 
thought: thus it is not necessary to view Absolutely Free Creativity as the pagan 
counterpart of God, in order to make sense of the notion. It also manifests as such, 
the highest attainment a human being can reach, and it remains a non-religious as well 
as a religious ideal well worth striving for.
Moreover, as I argue in the latter part of section 2, it is a human goal which 
manifests the same characteristics (in form and procedure, if not content), whether the 
free creativity occurs as a philosophical, artistic or religious insight, or discovery. 
Therefore, it is an ideal which all branches of human endeavour and knowledge can 
share. The cosmic kinship Plotinus advocates clearly reigns, in spite of divisive human 
efforts to exalt one’s preferred field, by depreciating others, or to attempt to set up one 
field of knowlege as paradigmatic, at the expense of others, which then may fail to 
"measure up" to this or that specific ideal.
Not only are all areas of knowledge subject to logical laws (such as consistency, 
or instance), but at the level of conclusions, arguments in all fields, if they represent a 
new discovery, will shave the unpredictability, imprecision and unexpectedness that is 
the distinguishing mark of true creativity. Neither scientist nor philosopher, neither 
mathematician nor mystic can predict or guarantee an insight that will couple novelty 
with Value (as Hausman for instance, requires), to acheive free Creativity.
Further, it is in Plotinus’ metaphysical understanding of the universe that this 
concept of creativity fits best. The reason is that the irreplaceable component of 
"goodness" or "value" is needed equally to turn simpley "novelty" into creativity, and 
also to produce Plotinus’ own notion of free creativity. For Plotinus, "not-good" equal 
"unfree", in the sense of being slave to passion, unimportant concerns, even overly 
attached to our embodied condition or to friends and family.
Finally, recent scientific discoveries in the behaviour of matter, the processes of 
chemistry and biology, and in cosmic creativity as well, all appear to fit well within 
Plotinus’ own insights. Perhaps tha time will come when those who wish to prepare for 
research in physics or biology, will need to read the Enneads of Plotinus, who shows 
how Unity and multiplicity arise from and ultimately fit within the One’s free creativity.
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The recent cosmological work of the philosopher John Leslie, among others, 
argues that the "argument from design" is not as silly as many previous philosophers 
have made it out to be, and the "God," could be understood--even from the standpoint 
of someone not belonging to a specific religious denomination--as creating the universe 
as a "Creative Ethical Requirement." He adds:
Using God like this has the approval of a long line of 
Platonic theologians. It is compatible with calling 
God personal, on the grounds that the unity of power 
and goodness, the ethical requirement which creativity 
requires our universe, is imagined as acting much as a 
benevolent person would, as expressing itself most fully 
in the creation of person (and, for Christians, in ija, 
creation of one person in particular), and so on. 41 '
Plotinus, of course, is much more than just a commentator on Plato, although that is 
indeed how he viewed himself. His originality cannot be disputed, and most of the 
doctrines and texts discussed in this paper attest to that fact, and to his real distance 
from Plato ôn many points. Nevertheless his concern with Plato’s work on one hand 
and with metaphysical principles, on the other, could earn him the status of 
metaphysician within the Platonic tradition. Still, having a First Principle which if Free 
Creativity, and which is identified with the Good, makes Plotinus a far better source of 
such cosmological views than any truly Platonic scholar.
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